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I. INTRODUCTION: A DEFEAT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The inability of the United Nations Security Council to determine
the outcome of the Iraq crisis has been interpreted by many as apossibly decisive-defeat for international law. Neoconservative intellectuals have denounced the impotence of international institutions and
international law to cope with emerging threats to international security.
In the words of Pentagon adviser Richard Perle: "[A]s we sift the debris
of the war to liberate Iraq, it will be important to preserve, the better to

understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety
through international law administered by international institutions."' In
*
Dr. jur., Ass. jur., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, Wissenschaftlicher Assistent (on leave), Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich. I
thank Robert Dieter, Robert Howse, Eric Jaworski, Nicolas Kredel, Nico Krisch, Thomas C.
Meerpohl, Russell Miller, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Brad Roth, Bruno Simma, and Sienho Yee

for their important comments and suggestions and Malte Christian Bode for his valuable research assistance.
1.
Richard Perle, United They Fall, THE SPECTATOR, Mar. 22, 2003, at 22.
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this perspective, international law is, on the one hand, unable effectively
to implement its own decisions and thus useless, and, on the other, based
on the sovereignty of democratic and 'rogue' states alike, and therefore
immoral. Security can only be guaranteed by a strong national state. The
checks and balances of power are of a domestic character.
Others, such as Jirgen Habermas,2 have interpreted the Iraq war not
so much as the defeat of international law, but of the normative authority
of the United States. By acting without the blessing of the Security
Council, the U.S.-led coalition was in breach of international law and the
U.N. Charter, an order the United States had itself built after World War
II "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."3 By waging
an aggressive war in violation of the U.N. Charter, the argument goes,
America has lost the persuasive power of the great ideas on which its
hegemonic power had as much rested as on its military and economic
prowess.
The stakes of the debate go beyond the fight against an evil dictator
or the threat of weapons of mass destruction: the nature of the international system and the moral authority of the largest power in the world
are in play.4 The premise of the project of international law, namely the
development of international relations from the realm of brute power to
the rule of law, seems lost.5 The combination of impotent law and illegal
power bodes badly for the rule of law in international affairs.
2.
Jirgen Habermas, Interpretingthe Fall of a Monument, 4 GERMAN L.J. 701 (2003),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.con/pdfJVolO4NoO7/PDF Vol_04_No-07-701708_EuropeanHabermas.pdf.

3.

U.N.

CHARTER

pmbl.

4.
For the perception of danger to the legal regulation of the law of force, see Lori
Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editors'Introduction,97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003)
("The military action against Iraq.. . is one of the few events of the U.N. Charter period holding the potential for fundamental transformation, or possibly even destruction, of the system
of law governing the use of force that had evolved during the twentieth century."). Thomas
Franck presents a particularly bleak outlook:
Now, however, in the new millennium, after a decade's romance with something
approximating law-abiding state behavior, the law-based system is once again being
dismantled. In its place we are offered a model that makes global security wholly
dependent on the supreme power and discretion of the United States and frees the
sole superpower from all restraints of international law and the encumbrances of institutionalized multilateral diplomacy.
Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607,
608 (2003). Even more pessimistic: "Article 2 (4) has died again, and, this time, perhaps for
good.... Thus has Article 2 (4) taken another hit; this time, however, as part of a much
broader plan to disable all supranational institutions and the constraints of international law on
national sovereignty." Id. at 610.
5.
For famous discussions of this progression from war to law, see Immanuel Kant,
The Metaphysics of Morals, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 171 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B.
Nisbet, trans., 2d ed., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1797); IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual
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And yet never before has international law been so popular. Millions
of peaceful protesters were marching to uphold it, in Berlin, London, and
even New York, the very place the Bush administration purported to defend by its attack. The Security Council, usually a serene, rubber-stamp
body for the policies determined elsewhere, was transformed into a parliamentary assembly of the leading nations of the world, in which the
for the alleged
U.S. Secretary of State attempted to produce evidence
• 6
Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, and in which the
French and British foreign ministers exchanged heated remarks on the
nature of the legal order and the legitimacy vel non of the use of force in
international affairs, winning applause from the usually so tacit audience
of diplomats and U.N. officials The non-permanent members of the
Council, frequently intent to further the narrow self-interests of their
countries or at least their regional group, resisted the pressure from the
only superpower and denied the United States and the United Kingdom
even the simple majority they had prematurely announced to be assured.8
Looking to New York in those days in February and early March, the
famous Martian might have come to believe that decisions are nowadays
not only taken in Washington or Moscow, but also, if not primarily, in
the halls of the U.N. building in Manhattan. Was this the ultimate climax

before the curtain-call?
The following Article is devoted to the question of the future relevance of international law at a time when the idea of a "rule of law" in
international affairs seems to be waning. Why should the sole superpower look to international law in its quest for protection from dangers
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at 93, 102-05 (1795);
Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT:
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at 41,47-49 (1784).
See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg., at 2-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003). For
6.
the later discovered inaccuracy of some of his statements, see the discussions of the testimony
of Dr. David Kay, infra note 72.
See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4707th mtg., at 11, 18-21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4707
7.
(2003). Also note the open debate under Rule 37 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure. Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4717th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/PV.4717 (2003). But note the absence of the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.K. Foreign Secretary in the last debate of the Council before the war. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess, 4721 st
mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.4721 (2003).
8.
Note the alleged U.S. belief that, absent the French veto, it had a majority in the
Council. Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576, 577 (2003). Wedgwood's source, a "veteran
American diplomat," is however contradicted by virtually every other observer. See the accounts by HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 7-8, 246-53 (2004); Tom J. Farer, The Prospectfor
International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 621, 626 (2003);
Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A TransitionalMoment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628,
629 n.3, 631 n.1 7 (2003) (citing additional sources). For further accounts of the backroom
dealings see BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 342-45 (2004) [hereinafter PLAN OF ATTACK]; James Rubin, Stumbling into War, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 46, 46-57.

Peace: A PhilosophicalSketch, in KANT:
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of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists? Is the European insistence
on questions of legality, which was visible in the dramatic British attempts
to secure some kind of Security Council backing and to advance international legal arguments for its participation in the invasion of Iraq, more
than a fig leaf for a quest for political relevance in spite of military ineptitude? 9 First, we will look back to the debate on the lawfulness of the attack
on Iraq. Before we can deal with the role and influence of international
law on political decision-making, the arguments of the coalition in favor of
the lawfulness of its invasion need to be taken at face value. Maybe the
changed realities of international life, in the era of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, require a reinterpretation of the
law-a law that may be not so ironclad as some European powers wanted
to make their audiences believe.'0 Or maybe we should give up the legal
enterprise altogether, following those who regard law in general, and international law in particular, as the "ideology of the status quo.'""
Secondly, we will try a glimpse into the future of international law.
Two contradictory options appear on the horizon: 1) the pluralist international order transforms into a "hegemonic international law," in which the
law translates the will of the hegemon into prescriptions binding on the
others;' 2 or 2) pluralism is maintained, but the superpower withdraws from
multilateral institutions in matters dealing with the use of force, if not
formally, then in substance; substituting permanent commitments by ad
hoc "coalitions of the willing." In conclusion, I argue that there are considerable stakes involved in whether the United States participates in
multilateral processes, and that the United States ultimately has an interest
in remaining within the system, just as much as the rest of the world has in
the United States' upholding the international legal order. Thus, instead of
opting for one of two bad alternatives-power without legitimacy or legitimacy without power-we need to maintain a balance between them.

9.
This was the argument used by Robert Kagan in Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y
REV. 3 (2002), available at http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html. For responses to
Kagan from a legal perspective, see Special Issue, New Transatlantic Tensions and the Kagan
Phenomenon, 4 GERMAN L.J. 863 (2003), availableat http://www.gernanlawjoumal.org/pdf/
Vol04/pdf-vol_04_no_09.pdf. In a recent article, Kagan emphasizes the importance of legitimacy, but charges the Europeans with ignorance of the threats. See Robert Kagan, America's
Crisis of Legitimacy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 65 (2004).
10.
See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 82 (2003); Wedgwood, supra note 8, at 582-84; John Yoo, InternationalLaw and
the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 571-76 (2003).
11.
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 86-87 (4th ed. 1967); cited in
MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER

Kosovo 5 (2001) [hereinafter LIMITS OF LAW].
12.
See Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843 (2001);
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003).
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DEBATE ON THE LAWFULNESS OF
THE INVASION OF IRAQ

In this Section, I will review the arguments leading towards the invasion of Iraq in the light of international law. However, this Article will not
arrive at a definitive conclusion as to the lawfulness of the attack.'3 Rather,
the goal is to show that the arguments on both sides are pre-determined by
competing conceptions of the international legal order--conceptions
which may switch from argument to argument, but which nevertheless
demonstrate a certain cohesion on each side. For the opponents of the war,
'international law administered by international institutions' is not a mere
illusion, but constitutes the only avenue towards a peaceful and just international order. For the supporters of military action against Saddam,
international law and institutions are only valuable if they contribute to the
effort to protect the world citizenry from terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. For the advocates of the war, there is no inherent value in the
use of institutional means as opposed to unilateral action.
Some analysts have claimed that the purported reasons for the war
were a sham, not worthy of serious debate. In the view of New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman, we have to distinguish between "the real
reason, the right reason, the moral reason and the stated reason."' 4 Needless to say, to Friedman, the stated reasons were irrelevant. Rather, he
argues:
[T]he "real reason" for this war, which was never stated, was that
after 9/11 America needed to hit someone in the Arab-Muslim
world.... The only way ... was for American soldiers, men and
women, to go into the heart of the Arab-Muslim world, house to
house, and make clear that we are ready to kill, and to die, to prevent our open society from being undermined by this terrorism
bubble.

13.
See Michael Bothe, Der Irak-Krieg und das volkerrechtliche Gewaltverbot, 41
ARCHIV DES V6LKERRECHTS 255 (2003); Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter
System of War Prevention?, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 590 (2003); Farer, supra note 8; Franck, supra
note 4; Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes", 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 585
(2003); Dietrich Murswiek, Die amerikanische Praventivkriegsstrategieund das Volkerrecht,
56 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1014 (2003); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands
of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599; Stromseth, supra note 8; Christian
Schaller, Massenvernichtungswaffen und Praventivkrieg-Mglichkeiten der Rechtfertigung
einer milit'rischen Intervention im Irak aus volkerrechtlicher Sicht, 62 ZEITSCHRHFr FUR
AUSL.KNDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 641 (2002); William H. Taft IV &
Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003);
Wedgwood, supra note 8; Yoo, supra note 10.
14.
Thomas Friedman, Because We Could, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A31.
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There is considerable evidence that Friedman may not be so far from the
truth.' 5 But the "stated reasons" are far from irrelevant. Rather, they reveal
the legal and moral concepts behind the action, the reasons believed to
work for the international audiences of governments, diplomats, and the
general public, including the U.S. bureaucracy. 6 For those who believe in
the vision of a rule of law in international affairs, the "stated," most of the
time legal, in any event publicly advanced reasons are at least as relevant
as the allegedly "real," psychological or political ones. The law must distinguish itself from politics to maintain its relevance. From that
perspective, a legal analysis of the "stated" reasons for the war remains
valid and important. 7 And yet, an exclusive focus on official legal representations, which will be designed to appease rather than provoke, may
run into the danger of underestimating the extent and the depth of the challenge to international law. Thus, the following Article attempts to present
the "Bush critique" of international law not only with reference to official
pronouncements by the Bush administration, but also to speeches as well
as policy documents explaining the position of the administration to the
general public.
1. Iraq's Violation of the Cease-Fire
The main argument of a legal nature advanced both by the United
States' 8 and the United Kingdom' 9 consisted in the "material breach" by

15.
See, e.g., Interview by Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair with Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy
Secretary of Defense (May 9-10, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
2003/tr20030509-depsecdefO223.html [hereinafter Wolfowitz Interview]. Wolfowitz argues
that "[tihe most significant thing that has produced what is admittedly a fairly significant
change in American policy is the events of September 11 th." Accordingly, the threat emanating from weapons of mass destruction was not the only reason for war. "The truth is that for
reasons that have a lot to do with U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue
that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction." Among other issues,
he names the alleged connection between weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism and the "criminal treatment of the Iraqi people." For a careful assessment, see John B.
Judis & Spencer Ackerman, The First Casualty, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 30, 2003, at 14.
For the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, see infra, notes 58, 72.
16.
See Wolfowitz Interview, supra note 15.
17.
See Jochen A. Frowein, 1st das Volkerrecht tot?, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jul. 23, 2003, at 6 (arguing that formal pronouncements to the Security Council are
more relevant for legal purposes than statements of a political character by the U.S. president).
18.
Letter Dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (2003) [hereinafter United States Letter]. For a presentation of the
relevant documents, see Contemporary Practice of the UnitedStates Relating to International
Law, 97 Am.J. INT'L L. 419 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2003).
19.
Letter Dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/350 (2003); see also Iraq: Legality of
Armed Force, 646 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (2003) WA2-WA3, available at
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Iraq of the conditions of the ceasefire imposed by Security Council
Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991. And indeed, the Security Council itself
determined, in Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, "that Iraq has
been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant
resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's
failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA."2 °
However, it "afford[ed] Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations" and set up "an enhanced inspection regime."" Any further violations of Iraq's disarmament
obligations, however, would not only be considered another "material
breach,, 22 but Iraq would face "serious consequences as a result of ...
continued violations. 2 3 However, except the decision that the Security
Council would "convene immediately" after respective reports by the
Executive Chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC), the resolution neither contained an explanation of the serious consequences nor an explicit authorization of member
states to use of force.
The U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, William H. Taft IV, and
the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs, Todd F. Buchwald, have recently argued that the determination of a material breach
alone rendered the unilateral use of force lawful.24 Others have maintained that the ambiguities of the resolution opened up both lines of
argument: either in favor of unilateral measures because they were not
expressly excluded, or in favor of collective measures by the Council.25
However, in light of the requirement of a positive authorization according to Chapter VII of the Charter, it seems impossible to maintain the
equal status of these two options. Indeed, the travaux of the resolution
strongly support this point of view. Three permanent members, who
could have vetoed Resolution 1441 and later refused to endorse U.S. and
British proposals for a resolution authorizing the use of force, declared
that their support of Resolution 1441 was premised on the absence of
any "hidden trigger" for the unilateral use of force:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo030317/text/30317w01 .htm
#30317w01_spnew2 [hereinafter Lord Goldsmith] (answer of Lord Goldsmith).
20.
S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 5.
24.
Taft & Buchwald, supra note 13, at 561; see also Lord Goldsmith, supra note 19
(making a similar argument).
25.
See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Interview, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Feb. 1, 2003, at 11
(expressing, however, an unambiguous "legal-political" argument in favour of the latter solution).
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Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted today by the Security Council
excludes any automaticity in the use of force. In this regard, we
register with satisfaction the declarations of the representatives
of the United States and the United Kingdom confirming this
understanding in their explanations of vote and assuring that the
goal of the resolution is the full implementation of the existing
Security Council resolutions on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction disarmament.26
Indeed, both the United States and the United Kingdom had declared
that the resolution did not in any way authorize the use of force.27
Contrary to the assertions of the U.S. Legal Advisors," Resolution 1441
(2002) cannot be equated with the famous Resolution 678 authorizing
the use of force for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990, because it does not
authorize "Member States . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement" the relevant Security Council resolutions. The very fact that
the United States and the United Kingdom sought another resolution
expressly authorizing what they intended to do anyway shows that they
found-or at least part of their political audiences found-that the
legitimacy that such an authorization would have provided was worth
taking the risk of refusal.29 In the words of Thomas Franck:
In fact, what Resolution 1441 did was to purchase unanimity for
the return of the inspectors by postponing to another day, which
the sponsors hoped might never be reached, the argument as to
whether Resolutions 678 and 687 had authorized further en-

26.
Irak: Joint statement from the Popular Republic of China, the Federation of Russia,
and France, Nov. 8, 2002, at http://www.un.int/france/documents-anglais/021108_cs_france_
irak_2.htm (last visited May 27, 2004).
27.
See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (2002)

(statement of U.S. Ambassador Negroponte) ("[T]his resolution contains no "hidden triggers"
and no "automaticity" with respect to the use of force.") In the foregoing meeting, Negroponte
reserves for the U.S. the right to act unilaterally, but this claim is not derived from the resolution: "If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this

resolution does not constrain any Member state from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and
security." Id.; see also id. at 4-5 (statement of U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock).
Wedgwood, otherwise a staunch defender of the Iraq action, apparently agrees: "The debate
over Resolution 1441 was thus a draw, and did not purport to revoke or amend the prior authority of Resolutions 678 and 687." Wedgewood, supra note 8, at 580.
28.
Taft & Buchwald, supra note 13, at 562-63.
29.
But see Taft & Buchwald, supra note 13, at 563 n.23. As Bob Woodward presents it,
it was the British prime minister Tony Blair who insisted on trying to win a second resolution,
against the will of both Vice President Cheney and Secretary of state Powell. PLAN OF ATTACK, supra note 8, at 297-98. President Bush apparently obliged.
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forcement at the sole discretion of one or more of the Council's
members.3 °
Thus, any justification of the U.S.-U.K. action needs to look beyond
resolution 1441 and the Charter provisions on the prohibition of the use
of force. Indeed, the preamble of the resolution itself contains, if not a
trigger, at least a hint to a more complex legal justification. Its preambular paragraphs refer to Resolution 678 of Nov. 29, 1990, which had,
famously, authorized "Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait... to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [demanding that Iraq evacuate Kuwaiti territory]
and to restore international peace and security in the area."3'
The preamble of Resolution 1441 construes a connection between
the cease-fire and the authorization to use force by "[r]ecallingthat in its
resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be
based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein. 3 2 There is unquestionably
some ingenuity in this wording, seemingly removing the ceasefire in
case of Iraqi non-observance. However, the cease-fire was conditioned
on Iraqi acceptance-which was forthcoming rather quickly-and not
on Iraqi compliance. In addition, according to resolution 687, the Security Council reserved for itself the task "to take such further steps as may
be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area."33

Accordingly, the Council was supposed to be the relevant decisionmaking body, not the Kuwaiti allies. Besides, by invading Iraq twelve
years after the liberation of Kuwait, the United States and the United
Kingdom pursued aims quite remote from those addressed in Resolution
678 (1990). 4
However, the connection of the cease-fire with the authorization of
the use of force, one may argue, goes deeper. Is not any armistice subject
to the fulfillment of its conditions by the defeated party? According to
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a "material
breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
30.
Franck, supra note 4, at 614.
31.
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678
(1990) (emphasis added).
32.
S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 20, at 2 (emphasis added).
33.
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0687

(1991).
34.
According to Yoo, Resolution 678 continued to authorize the use of force. Yoo,
supra note 10, at 567. This understanding would transform Resolution 678 in an extraordinary
semi-permanent authorization to use force against Iraq. All odds of the Charter system are
against such an interpretation.
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invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty."35 Since the
Security Council had confirmed recurring material breaches and warned
of serious consequences in case of recurrence, and since Iraq had not
fulfilled its reporting requirements contained in Resolution 1441-were
the United States and the United Kingdom not in a position to declare
the cease-fire terminated? However, the resolution is an enforcement
measure by the Security Council under Chapter VII, not a treaty between
individual Council members and Iraq. The only party to such a treaty
with Iraq, e.g. the ensuing cease-fire agreement resulting from the
acceptance of Resolution 687, is the United Nations. Accordingly, it
would be for the Security Council to terminate the cease-fire, not for the
United States and Britain.36
The laws of war do not help much more.37 According to Article 40 of
the Hague Regulations, "[a]ny serious violation of the armistice by one
of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even,
in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately."38 But the
Hague Regulations presuppose the very existence of an armistice agreement by the parties, which does not exist between the coalition and Iraq,
but only, if at all, between the United Nations and Iraq.
In the end, the lack of any language authorizing the unilateral use of
force by member states leads to the conclusion that the Security Council
had neither explicitly nor implicitly authorized the use of force. The remaining room for unilateral action, however, depends on the question of
whether one regards the Charter system of collective security as complete or as leaving room for unilateral action. Two lines of argument are
possible to challenge this assumption. According to one opinion, the law
on the use of force has ceased to exist.39 However, no state has yet em35.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346.
36.
See Franck, supra note 4, at 612 ("[T]his proviso [of a cease-fire agreement between the U.N. and Iraq] manifests that it is the Security Council and the United Nations, and
not individual members, who are the parties, with Iraq, to the cease-fire agreement. It is they
who are entitled in law to determine whether Iraq is complying with its commitments to the
Council, how long these are to remain in effect, and what is to be done in the event of their
violation.")
37.
But see Yoo, supra note 10, at 568.
38.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
40, 36 Stat. 2277, 2305-06, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461,499.
39.
This is maintained primarily by Michael Glennon. Michael Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AlT., May-June 2003, at 16, 16 (2003) [hereinafter Why the
Security Council Failed]; Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law. Self-Defence, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 539, 540 passim
(2002); LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 1-2 passim. For a succinct rebuttal of his arguments
in light of recent events and literature, see Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article
2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 545 (1971); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Review Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 447-48 (2003); Jane E.
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braced such a sweeping proposition, not even a member of the coalition
against Saddam's Iraq. Rather, the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be of the opinion that the system needs to accord wide
latitude to states in order to fill the lacuna left by the ineffectiveness of
the U.N. security system. Accordingly, states are deemed authorized to
act in case the Security Council does not properly implement its decisions.40 There is little doubt that such a perspective does not conform to a
view of the U.N. as an effective collective security system. But for those
who do not share this assumption, the U.S.-U.K. argument is much more
compelling. Ultimately, the dispute unveils conceptual differences on the
nature of the collective security system of the Charter and the effectiveness of the prohibition on the unilateral use of force except in selfdefense.
2. Pre-Emptive Self-Defense Against the Combined Threats of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism
A similar logic applies to the other argument advanced by the United
States, namely that the threat of weapons of mass destruction and their
proliferation into the hands of terrorists or "rogue states" requires modifications to the international legal framework on the use of force. The
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States puts the argument
strongly as one of necessity, an adaptation of the right to self-defense to
new circumstances:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned
the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and
air forces preparing to attack.4
Indeed, the maximum degree of flexibility for anticipatory selfdefense was traditionally defined by the conditions first enunciated in the
Caroline negotiations between Britain and the United States in 1842 by
Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 632
(2003). See also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. No. 90 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge
Simma, TT 5-8), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1428, 1430-31 (2003) (stating a need for the court to reaf-

firm the law of the use of force).
40.
See DEREK W. BOWETT,

SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-93 (1958).
41.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited July 12, 2004) [here-

inafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. For a spirited defense of its approach, see Abraham
Sofaer, On the Necessity of Preemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt,
Preemptive Strategies in InternationalLaw, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 513, 534-35 (2003).
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U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, according to which any kind of
anticipatory self-defense required that the "necessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. ' 2 For some, even such limited, "preemptive" selfdefense goes too far, because it seems to run counter to the wording of
Article 51 requiring a previous armed attack.4'3 The stakes in this debate
can hardly be overestimated. In the words of Thomas Franck, who generally argues for a middle
position,4 but has strongly denounced the use
45
of force against Iraq:
[A] general relaxation of Article 51's prohibitions on unilateral
war-making to permit unilateral recourse to force whenever a
State feels potentially threatened could lead to another reductio ad
absurdum. The law cannot have intended to leave every State free
to resort to military force whenever it perceived itself grievously
endangered by action of another, for that would negate any role
for law.46
Even the National Security Strategy does not consider "preemption"
as part of international law in force. Instead, it argues for an adaptation
of international law to new international threats:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and
terrorists ... rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of

42.
Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton, Aug. 6, 1842, reprinted in 2 INT'L
L. DIGEST 412 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906); see also Robert Y Jennings, The Carolineand
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938). The Nuremberg judgment regarded the
Caroline case as the ultimate limit of the anticipatory use of self-defense. See International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
172, 205 (1947).
43.
See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 788, 803 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Michael Byers, Preemptive
Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171, 180
(2003). For an account of the drafting history confirming these views, see THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACK 50
(2002). But see id. at 67 n.82, 97-108 (discussing the development of the argument of anticipatory self-defense); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Preemptive Force, 14 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 227, 231 (2003). Cf. Randelzhofer, supra, at 188 (arguing for "mitigation" in cases
of pre-emption); OPPENHEIM'S INT'L LAW 420 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992) ("[Tlhe basic elements of the right of self-defence were aptly set out in connection with the Caroline incident in 1837 by ... Daniel Webster"). For further discussion, see id.
at 420-422.
44.
FRANCK, supra note 43, at 107-08 (2002).
45.
Franck, supra note 4.
46.
FRANCK, supra note 43, at 98 (citing IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

275 (1963)).
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weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning....

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the
more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our• adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act
41
preemptively.
The relationship of this statement to the Iraq crisis is evident. On
many occasions, the administration has emphasized that it considers unacceptable the mere possibility that rogue regimes could acquire
weapons of mass destruction, because they may distribute them to terrorists. In this context, the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda on September 11,
2001, have played a prominent role in the argument of the administration. In the deliberations of the National Security Council, Iraq was the
focus of the Pentagon early on.4'8 Although there is no evidence that Iraq
participated in any way in the attacks of September 11,49 it has also taken
a prominent place in the public justifications for the Iraq action. In his
speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President

47.
48.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at 15.
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 49, 60-61, 83 (2002) [hereinafter BUSH AT
WAR] (quoting Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz arguing that Iraq should be on the list of targets in the
alleged war on terror on September 12 and 13, 2001, respectively); PLAN OF ATTACK, supra note
8, at 24-26. Woodward's presentation was recently corroborated by National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice, who stated:
There was a discussion of Iraq. I think it was raised by Don Rumsfeld. It was pressed
a bit by Paul Wolfowitz. Given that this was a global war on terror, should we look not
just at Afghanistan but should we look at doing something against Iraq? ... [W]hen
[the President] went around the table and asked his advisers what he should do, not a
single one of his principal advisers advised doing anything against Iraq.
Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor, Public Testimony before the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9th Public Hearing, Apr. 8, 2004, transcript of CNN,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLMCS/04/08/rice.transcript/index.html (last
visited July 8, 2004). Woodward adds that the President himself told Rice that "eventually we'll
have to return to that question." PLAN OF ATTACK, supra note 8, at 26. He also asserts that the
President started war planning already on Nov. 21, 2001. Id. at 1-3.
49.
See President's Remarks Following a Meeting with the Congressional Conference
Committee on Energy Legislation and an Exchange with Reporters, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1237, 1238 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/09/20030917-7.html.
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Bush tried to convince U.N. members that action against Iraq was required because of the possible supply of WMD to terrorists:
[O]ur greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their
mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the
technologies to kill on a massive scale....
The first time we may be completely certain [Saddam Hussein]
has a-nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We
owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent
that day from coming.'
In a domestic environment, the President has emphasized the link
between his Iraq policies and the "war on terrorism" even more clearly.
In a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, Bush stressed the "grave threat to
peace" emanating from Iraq, and added: "On September the 11 th, 2001,
America felt its vulnerability, even to threats that gather on the other side
of the earth. We resolved then and we are resolved today to confront
every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America."'
The mere potentiality of the provision of WMD to terrorists is
deemed to justify immediate action:
Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or
chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack
America without leaving any fingerprints....
Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final
proof-the smoking gun-that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud 2
When announcing the end of major combat operations, Bush made clear
that "[tihe battle of Iraq is one victory in'5a3 war on terror that began on
September the 11, 2001, and still goes on.
50.

President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,

38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1529, 1530-32 (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1 .html.
51.
President's Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 38 WEEKLY COMR.
PRES. Doc. 1716, 1716 (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/10/20021007-8.html.
52.
Id. at1717-18.
53.
President's Address to the Nation on Iraq from the USS Abraham Lincoln,
39 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 516, 517 (May 1, 2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501 -15.html.
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Thus, abstract risks of an uncertain nature upset the elaborate structure of the law of force. As the International Court of Justice has recently
reminded us, the burden of proof for the existence of an armed attack
lies with the state invoking self-defense 4 The National Security Strategy, however, provides for unilateral action without or with only scant
evidence. The size of the risk is deemed to outweigh traditional standards of proof for the immediacy of an armed attack.
And yet, it is in the nature of state governments-in particular of superpowers-to consider security as the one concern superseding all
others. In a more limited fashion, the International Court of Justice has
recognized that state survival is a legitimate consideration relating both
to the ius ad bellum and to the ius in bello:
[T]he Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at
stake.... [T]he Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of
nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of selfdefence, in which its very survival would be at stake. 5
Of course, the ICJ did not opine on the required concreteness of the
risk to state survival and on the standard of proof. Nevertheless, its pronouncement points to the fact that, in state practice, security and survival
are of a vital importance and may justify certain modifications of, or exceptions to, the prohibitions on the use of force and the restrictions on
the means of warfare. 6 The very combination of an argument on the ius
ad bellum with the prohibition of a weapon in the ius in bello-an otherwise cardinal sin in the law of war--exemplifies the exceptional nature
the Court accords to the state right to survival.
Thus, the recent debate on the lack of evidence for the possession of
weapons of mass destruction by Iraq57 somewhat misses the point. In the
eyes of the Bush administration, Saddam's intention to possess and
develop WMD, combined with the use of such weapons in the past, did
not call merely for further investigation, but for action-and the less

54.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. No. 90 (Nov. 6) In 57, 61, 71, 42 I.L.M. 1334,
1356-57, 1360 (2003).
55.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8).
56.
Note the declaration of then President Bedjaoui, who weighs the ius cogens principle
of international humanitarian law against that of state survival and thus endorses the ius cogens
character of the latter. Id. at 268, 273. Note also Dean Acheson's observation that state survival is
not a matter of law. Dean Acheson, Remarks, 57 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 13, 14 (1963); see
also Schmitt, supra note 41, at 543-44.
57.
See supra note 15.
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advanced Saddam's weapons programs were, the better. 8 In addition, the
U.S. determination is supposed to exert pressure on other states to forego
weapons of mass destruction. Libya is a case in point, although its
negotiations with the United States, Britain and France date from the
time before the Iraq war. 9
But this strong version of a "precautionary approach" carries great
risk. Other countries possessing weapons of mass destruction, such as
Russia or India, may draw on this precedent to justify highly problematic
activities both on their own territory-e.g., Chechnya--or against other
states allegedly supporting terrorist groups, e.g., Pakistan. The pressure
on third states can hardly justify the attack on a state that did not constitute a threat by itself.
Thus, one of the central tenets of contemporary international law, the
prohibition on the use of force, is under threat. The preemption of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation is regarded as more
important than the avoidance of war. Some already claim that the prohibition has ceased to be good law.6°But such an argument throws the baby
out with the bathwater. A broad notion of self-defense, whatever one
thinks of its justification, does not cancel out the general prohibition on
the use of force. What remains is a basic conflict between the prohibition
and the interest of survival, which also entails a certain justification for
preemptive action. What is in question, however, is who is to strike the
balance.
3. The Coalition Acting in the Common Interest
Normally, the alternatives are presented by way of pitting the unilateralism of the current U.S. administration against traditional
multilateralism 6 -the younger Bush against the older Bush, the champion of America acting alone against the proponent of a "new world

58.
Bob Woodward reports that President Bush was skeptical concerning the CIA evidence regarding Iraqi WMD but apparently relied on CIA Director George Tenet's assertion
that it was "a slam dunk case." PLAN OF ATTACK, supra note 8, at 249. But others, notably in
Congress, were more cautious. Id. at 295, 308-09. More importantly, however, Bush stressed
to Woodward that he deems sufficient the evil nature of Saddam and the existence of weapon
programs. Id. at 422-23.
See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the state of the
59.
Union, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 94, 96 (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (claiming credit for Libya's
renunciation of WMD). "For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one
can now doubt the word of America." Id. But see Flynt Leverett, Why Libya Gave Up on the
Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A23 (arguing that Libya's re-engagement with international institutions predates the Iraq war).
See supra note 39.
60.
61.
See Symposium, Unilateralismin InternationalLaw, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
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order."62 The "(George W.) Bush doctrine" of the unilateral use of force
in self-defense against terrorists constitutes a marked departure from the
previous emphasis on the backing of allies and the United Nations, even
at the cost of some modifications. The President's 2002 speech before
the U.N. General Assembly clearly contained a challenge to the organization: Either follow U.S. lead in the aggressive pursuit of "self-defense"
against terrorists and rogue regimes, or become irrelevant and unable to
influence U.S. policies any further. In a truly hegemonic attitude, the rest
of the world represented in the U.N. is asked to follow the U.S. lead or
fall into oblivion:
We created a United Nations Security Council so that, unlike the
League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk,
our resolutions would be more than wishes....

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of
the United Nations, and a threat to peace....

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet
our common challenge.... But the purposes of the United
States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions
will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be
met, or action will be unavoidable.63
In his State of the Union address in 2003, Bush repeated his vision of a
United States which serves the interests of humankind:
America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our
country and our friends and our allies....
We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If
Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our

62.
See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf
Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1218, 1219, 1222 (Sept. 11, 1990);
President's Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the state of the Union, 1991
PUB. PAPERS 74, 79 (Jan. 29, 1990); President's Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War
College in Montgomery, Alabama, 1991 PuB. PAPERS 364, 366 (Apr. 13, 1991); President's
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict
1991 PUB. PAPERS 218, 221 (Mar. 6, 1991).
63.
President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 50, at
1529, 1532.
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people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to
disarm him.64
Thus, the United States may act alone when it considers its actions as
indispensable for the well-being of the world, purporting to serve "the
permanent rights and the hopes of mankind.' 65 As a sympathetic observer
has remarked, "[t]he U.S. government has relegated to itself not only the
ability to act in its own interest, but also to redefine the criteria for appropriate uses of force in the common interest."
As superpower, the United States claims to be responsible for the
world, and to lead where the United Nations is incapacitated. In fact, a
similar rationale was invoked for the Kosovo intervention, with the support of all NATO allies.67 In the end, the argument goes, results count,
not process. In the words of the U.S. President:
Well, we're never going to get people all in agreement about
force and use of force. But action-confident action that will
yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind and show themselves
that... something positive has happened toward peace.68
Undoubtedly, the U.N. sanctions had cost many people's lives, had gruesome effects on the Iraqi population, and had not succeeded in eliciting
full Iraqi cooperation. 69 But the Iraqi response to Security Council Resolution 1441 was not all negative. For many Security Council members,
the U.N. inspections were doing the job and Iraqi co-operation was not
excellent, but sufficient.7 For the Bush administration, the burden of
proof was on Saddam Hussein, and it had not been met. Thus, it is difficult to maintain that the U.N. system was not working and the U.S.-led
coalition needed to substitute for collective non-action.
64.
President's Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the state of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 109, 116 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
65.
President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 50, at
1533.
66.
A Letter to the Presidentfrom Fredrick S. lipson, NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y Int'l Law,
Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 1, 4.
67.
See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L.

68.

1 (1999).

BUSH AT WAR, supra note 48, at 341 (quoting Bush).
69.
For a legal analysis see, for example, Symposium, The Impact on InternationalLaw
of a Decade of MeasuresAgainst Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (containing various contributions on the matter); August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw
Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851 (2001).
70.
See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess, 4707th mtg., supra note 7. See also BLIX, supra note 8,
at 237.
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On the other hand, some kind of emergency powers in case of international inertia should not be completely excluded, if genocide and
massive and imminent threats are to be avoided. Such is the logic behind
Article 51 of the Charter, which allows for self-defense absent sufficient
international action; and one may indeed ask why it should not be extended to similar situations of direct and imminent danger.7' However, it
is questionable whether this was indeed the situation in Iraq before the
invasion. It seems every day more likely that the threat of weapons of
mass destruction
or even of weapons-related programs was virtually
•
72
non-existent. The president himself now speaks merely of "weaponsof-mass-destruction-related program activities. 73
The question remains whether these intelligence failures can be
avoided, and who bears the risk of a faulty assessment. The premise of a
collective decision-making process is that a collective determination (as
the one by the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter) is more
reliable and therefore more legitimate than a unilateral assessment not
subject to the same international scrutiny. In light of the evidence-or
rather the lack of it-it appears difficult to argue that the Iraq case demonstrates that this assumption is patently false.
4. Regime Change for Democracy
The less likely the discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
becomes, the more the argument shifts to political and humanitarian
grounds. The most challenging of the U.S. reasons for invading Iraq is
71.
For an argument not excluding the unilateral use of force when all multilateral avenues are exhausted, see Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 136, 148-49. The authors of this piece avoid taking a stand on
whether the Iraq intervention meets their criteria for unilateral action. But see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Reflecting on the War in Iraq One Year Later, NEWSL.(Am. Soc'y Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 1, 2 ("A year later, I conclude that the invasion was both
illegal and illegitimate."). One must be permitted to ask, however, what relevance international law would have if it allowed only for a determination one year after political action.
Thus, Slaughter's late answer as to the legitimacy of the Iraq war demonstrates the importance
of a strictly legal, ex-ante determination of legality as opposed to open-ended legitimacy. On
the value of law in politics, see Andreas Paulus, Realism and InternationalLaw: Two Optics
in Need of Each Other, 96 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 269 (2002).
72.
On the testimony of Dr. David Kay, former chief weapons inspector regarding the
lack of WMD in Iraq before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, on January 28,
2004, see Richard W. Stevenson & Thom Shanker, Ex-Arms Monitor Urges an Inquiry on Iraq
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2004, at Al. See also James Risen, C.LA. Lacked Iraq Arms
Data, Ex-Inspector Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at Al; Barton Gellman, Iraq's Arsenal
Was Only on Paper, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2004, at AO1; JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., WMD IN
IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS (2004), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/
Iraq3FullText.pdf.
73.
See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, supra note 59, at 97.
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the request for regime change. The U.S. government has argued all along
that the nature of the Iraqi regime itself constituted a threat to its
neighbors and the world at large. In fact, the policy originated in Congress during the Clinton presidency. In the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998,
Congress declared its sense that "[i]t should be the policy of the United
States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic
government to replace that regime. 74 The law included authorization for
assistance to Iraqi opposition groups, but did not provide for military
action by the United States. After September 11, Vice-President Richard
Cheney argued that regime change in Iraq would have positive repercussions for the whole Middle East:
Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits
to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the
freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace.... With our help, a
liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again.... Our goal
would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that
is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of
every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected.7 5
As President Bush emphasized in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, "[1]iberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great
strategic goal.... Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and
conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder."76 By that logic, only a democratic Iraq will be able to meet its
disarmament commitments.
In his above-mentioned Article, Richard Perle adds an indictment of
the United Nations for being accessible to both democracies and dictatorships alike. He favors instead a "willing coalition of liberal
democracies., 7' According to Perle, the idea of a U.N. monopoly on the
use of force is fundamentally flawed: "This ... idea ... leads inexorably
to handing great moral-and even existential politico-military decisions-to the likes of Syria, Cameroon, Angola, Russia, China and
France.,,7' Let us abstain to comment on the inclusion of France into this
74.
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, § 3, 112 Stat. 3178, 3179 (1998).
75.
Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103d
National Convention (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/08/20020826.html.
76.
President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 50, at
1532; see Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 71, at 136.
77.
Perle, supra note 1; see also LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 4-5.
78.
Perle, supra note 1, at 22.
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list. The question is nevertheless valid: why not substitute for the U.N. a
community of democratic nations, which would benefit from a much
greater moral authority? 79 In a recent speech, President Bush has cited
U.S. power and the spread of democracy as two sides of the same coin.'
The classic counter-argument rejects the use of issues of democratic
legitimacy for the justification of the use of force. It points to the pluralism in an international society that is, alas, not composed of democratic
states only. For the opponents of the Iraq invasion, democracy may be
important-but peace is more so. The authority of the prohibition on the
use of force ultimately depends on the question whether one is ready to

sacrifice peace for the spread of democracy. So far, international lawyers
have debated the existence of a right to democratic governance,' but no
one has argued so far that democracy justifies military action. Neither,
explicitly, has the United States. 83 This is however what some in the Bush
administration seem to have adopted as their strategy for a lasting peace
in the Middle East. If accepted, this argument would indeed lead to a

profound transformation of international law from a pluralist to a liberaldemocratic order backed by force.

5. Humanitarian Intervention
In the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the justification of
the Iraq intervention more and more shifts to the egregious human rights
violations of the Saddam regime. President Bush spoke of the suffering
of the Iraqi people early on: "Clearly there will be a strategic implication
79.
Wedgwood seems to suggest as much. See Wedgwood, supra note 8, at 578.
80.
President's Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1542, 1542-43 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/l 1/20031106-2.html ("It is no accident that
the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation
was itself a democracy.").
81.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). For a collection of the most important contributions to the debate,
see DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth

eds., 2000).
82.
The closest the international debate has approached the question of the relationship
between democracy and peace deals with domestic law, see Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte,
Intolerant Democracies, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
81, p. 389. But see also the vigorous responses by Martti Koskenniemi, Whose Intolerance,
Which Democracy?, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81,
at 436, and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox and Nolte, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 441.

83.
See United States Letter, supra note 18 (concentrating on previous Security Council
resolutions and mentioning self-defense in passing). For an analysis of earlier practice involving the promotion of democracy as a justification for military intervention, see CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 43-44 (2000). See also BRAD R. ROTH,
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1999).
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to a regime change in Iraq, if we go forward. But there's something beneath that, as far as I'm concerned, and that is, there is immense
suffering."'
According to this argument, the imposition of democracy by force
may not be frequent. However, when the repression of and violence
against one's own people goes beyond a certain threshold, then the use
of force from the outside against the regime will be justified. In his U.N.
speech, Bush referred to the assessment of the Commission on Human
Rights:
Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found
that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens
of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have
been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary
execution, and torture ....Wives are tortured in front of their
husbands, children in the presence of their parents, and all of
these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.85
The prevention of crimes against the civil population was one of the
reasons for the Kosovo intervention. Since the 19th century, it constitutes
a rather traditional topos of Western policies. The gruesome details of
the Saddam regime that have now clearly emerged (although they were
not really new) add credibility to the argument that there had indeed
been grounds for humanitarian intervention along the Kosovo precedent.
These revelations raise all the old questions on the legality and morality
of intervention in the absence of Security Council authorization.8' But, as
Human Rights Watch has recently pointed out, the extreme urgency to
stop ongoing bloodshed, which was so pressing in the Kosovo case,
84.
BUSH AT WAR, supra note 48, at 339; see also id. at 340 ("There is a human condition that we must worry about ....As we think through Iraq, we may or may not attack. I
have no idea yet. But it will be for the objective of making the world more peaceful.").
85.
President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 50, at
1530.
86.
See, in particular, John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in JOHN
STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION 110 (John M. Robson ed., Univ.
of Toronto Press 1984) (1859); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 86-108 (3d ed.

2000).
87.

From the enormously rich literature, see

SION ON

Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:

INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMIS-

CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSE,

LESSONS

(2000); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community?, 10
LEARNED

EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); FRANCK, supra note 43, at 135-91; Simma,

supra note 67.
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seems to be largely absent with respect to Iraq, because the most egregious violations dated back to the early 1990s, and the Shiites were to a
certain extent protected by no-fly-zones, whereas most of the Kurds enjoyed a state of quasi-independence." Nevertheless, a ruler such as
Saddam Hussein is a continual threat to the most basic human rights of
his people, and prone not only to maintain a repressive regime, but also
to repeat his egregious behavior whenever it suits his lust for power.89
However, the justification of the Iraq invasion as humanitarian intervention raises some suspicion because it was clearly raised only after the
fact, when it became likely that the other reasons would not hold up to
scrutiny. Although Paul Wolfowitz lists the "criminal treatment of the
Iraqi people" among the reasons for the intervention, he also adds that to
help the Iraqis was "not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, cer'9° Besides, human rights are not
tainly not on the scale we did it.
mentioned in any of the official documents justifying the intervention in
legal terms, neither in Resolution 1441 (2003), nor in the U.S. and U.K.
letters to the Security Council. 9'
Thus, humanitarian intervention seems not to be used as an independent argument for armed intervention as such, at least not when there
is no acute, urgent situation where parts of a population fight for their
survival against genocide or crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the
clash between the values of an inter-state system and human rights is
clearly visible.

88.
See Gardner, supra note 13, at 589-90; Farer, supra note 8, at 624-25; Ken Roth,
War in Iraq: Not a HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT
2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT 13 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/
wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf. According to this view, only "ongoing or imminent genocide, or
comparable mass slaughter or loss of life" justifies armed intervention. Id. at 17. Of course,
the result depends on whether one agrees to such a narrow standard. See also Jutta Brunne &
Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: InternationalLaw After Iraq, 53 INT. & COMP. L.Q.
(forthcoming 2004).
89.
I am grateful to Professor Robert Howse for urging me to clarify this point. For a
further discussion on changes of the Charter system to allow for interventions in case of gross
violations of human rights and international criminal law, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 32-37, 55
(2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caliciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf;
Brunnde & Toope, supra note 88; Jutta Brunnhe & Stephen J. Toope, Slouching Towards New
'Just' Wars: The Hegemon After September llth (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript Apr. 15,
2004, on file with the author) [hereinafter Just Wars]; David Luban, Preventive War, 32 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 207 (2004). Luban argues, however, that humanitarian intervention against Iraq
would at least have been justified in the late 1980s at a time when the U.S. was aligned with
Iraq rather than the Kurds. Id. at 231 n.43 (manuscript).
90.
Wolfowitz Interview, supra note 15. This passage reminds one of Bismarck's
(in)famous phrase that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier.
91.
See supra notes 18-20.
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COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

The reconsideration of the arguments on the use of force against Iraq
has shown that the debate not only involved the specifics of the situation,
but fundamentals of the international order after September 11 and the
fall of the Berlin wall: the impact of the U.N. on world politics, the legalization and moralization of international relations, the role of the
single superpower as guarantor or violator of international law, the role
of other states as subcontractors of or counter-weight to the United
States, the impact of liberal values on a legal order between states. Both
sides have a fundamentally different view of the current international
system and the role of international law. In the following, we will look
more closely at these background assumptions of international law in the
post-September 11 international (dis)order. We will try to engage the
contradictions which have been used in the public debate-might versus
right, unilateralism versus multilateralism, prevention versus repression,
hegemony versus sovereign equality, democratic imperialism versus pluralism. How can international law meet these apparently contradictory
considerations? A closer look shows that these contradictions to a certain
extent already exist in contemporary international law, which maintains a
delicate balance between the coexistence of different value-systems and
the promotion of some communal values.92
1. Might v. Right
According to the understanding of Habermas and others, 93 the Iraq
war constitutes a severe setback for all attempts to legalize international
relations 94 with respect to the use of force as embodied in the U.N.
Charter. However, this account of the situation is problematic both in the
law and in the facts. The drafters of the Charter did not have in mind the
enforcement of international law as such. On the contrary, the goal was
to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace and security.95
92.
For broader analysis, see ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE
GEMEINSCHAFT IMVOLKERRECHT 439-46 (2001).
93.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Rule of Power or Rule of Law? (Nicole
Deller et al. eds., 2003)
94.
See Debate, The Legalization of International Relations, 96 AM. Soc. INT'L L.
PRoc. 291 (2002); see also Special Issue, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385
(2000) (discussing unilateral military intervention as an exception to the general trend of increasing legalization of international relations).
95.
See INIS CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 71-76 (4th ed. 1984); Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 139-40 (1995); MORTON KAPLAN & NICOLAS DE BARON KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-17 (1961); PAULUS, supra
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The Charter is not based on the primacy of law, but on collective security
provided by superpower involvement and broad Security Council
discretion. The Council is not bound by international law itself, but only
by the "Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." 96 Thus, the
Charter is a very incomplete expression of a legalist international order.
Secondly, the coalition did not shun international law. Even if one
broadly shares the estimate of American Society of International Law
President Anne-Marie Slaughter that about eighty percent of
international lawyers-at least outside the United States-deemed the
war on Iraq illegal,9 it is simply untrue that the United States and its
coalition partners regarded legality as irrelevant. Instead, all of them
argued that international law supported their conclusions. Thus, the
question was not so much "might versus right," but which concept of
"right" to adopt: 1) a legalist position based on the U.N. Charter, which
held that every use of force needed to be either an exercise of selfdefense or mandated by the Security Council; 2) a broader interpretation
that allowed for the unilateral implementation of Security Council
resolutions in case of inaction of the Council and for a broad
interpretation of the "inherent right to self-defense" under Article 51 of
the Charter; or 3) at the other extreme, a position according to which the
prohibition on the use of force had expired or, to use the famous phrase
coined by Thomas Franck, had been killed. 99
Some supporters of the invasion of Iraq have apparently adopted the
latter position,' but it does not constitute the official view of the administration. Otherwise, the U.S. letter to the Security Council, in which
it justified its actions as conforming to international law,'01 would be a
note 92, at 287-92; see also Ian Hurd, Too Legit to Quit, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at
204; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Misreading the Record, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 202.
96.
U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2; see Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Introduction to ChapterVII, in CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at
701, 710-12 (citing additional sources).
97.
International Law Expert Says U.S. Should Delay an Iraq Attack Until It Gains
Security Council Backing, Interview by Bernard Gewertzman, Council of Foreign Relations,
with Anne-Marie Slaughter, at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5646 (Mar. 3, 2003) ("I
think it is certainly true that eight out of 10 international lawyers would say that would be a
violation of international law. That view would also be supported by the legal advisers of most
other countries in the United Nations.").
98.
Supra notes 18, 19.
99.
In this vein, see, in particular, Why the Security Council Failed, supra note 39. For
sharp criticism, see in particular Franck, supra note 4. Cf Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed
Article 2(4), or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
809 (1970). Franck now asks: "Who killed Article 2(4) again?" Franck, supra note 4, at 607.
100.
See Anthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and Rogue States: The Failureof the
Charter Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 735, 751-53 (2002); Glennon, supra note 39;
Perle, supra note 1.
101.
United States Letter, supra note 18.
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sheer exercise in hypocrisy. What the administration has done, both in its
National Security Strategy and in its public justifications of its actions, is
to advance a position of how the law should change or at the very least
be reinterpreted. 02 The United States did not argue that it may use force
whenever it pleases-thus, Michael Glennon is wrong when he claims
that the United States "felt free to announce in its national security
document that it would no longer be bound by the charter's rules governing the use of force."10 3
Yet, if the law concerning the international use of force is not to become irrelevant, it must enjoy a minimum degree of effectiveness. As
long as states perceive a need to justify their actions in the terms of international law, it maintains a certain "compliance pull."' 04 As the
International Court of Justice has pointed out in the Nicaragua case,
every justification of the violation of a rule by a reliance on a different
interpretation confirms rather than weakens the rule.'0 5 Thus, the coalition justifications for the invasion of Iraq, both formal and informal,
demonstrate the lasting viability rather than the demise of the international regulation of the use of force. Without recognizing that he thereby
admits as much, Michael Glennon describes the need for states to justify
their behavior according to international law: "In most situations, little is
to be gained through a frontal challenge to existing law. To do so could
lead to broader disorder, which few States see as in their interest, as well
as to condemnation and possible reprisals."' But international law had
also immediate practical effects. The difficulties the United States now
102.
See supra note 18; NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41 and accompanying text. The timid presentation by the State Department's legal advisers, Taft & Buchwald,
supra note 13, at 563 (stating that preemptive use of force is justified only in the context of a
broader conflict and/or when consistent with SC resolutions), demonstrates the reluctance
even within the administration to declare the unilateral preemptive use of force lawful. See
also Reisman, supra note 10, at 89-90 (regarding the claim to the preemptive use of force as
lexferenda, not lex lata).
103.
Why the Security Council Failed,supra note 39, at 24.
For the term, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NA104.
TIONS 24 (1989).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27)
105.
("If a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether
or not the state's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of the attitude is to
confirm rather than to weaken the rule."). On the role of state justifications in affirming the
viability of the rule, see also GRAY, supra note 83, at 18-23.
106.
LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 43. In his rejection of the ICJ argument, Gelnnon
confuses the continual approval of the substance of a rule with assertions of its validity, that
is, their character as part of existing international law. Id. at 44-46. Glennon's examples defeat
his arguments. When he asserts that the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea
ceased to be law because they were repudiated by "[w]idespread and consistent state declarations," he forgets to mention that in case of the prohibition on the use of force, all state
declarations are to the contrary. Id. at 47.
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faces in Iraq are a case in point: the perceived lack of legal justification
of the war has undercut U.S. efforts to receive sufficient international
assistance. Claiming "might" as "right" would further deprive the United
States from the cooperation of other actors.
Glennon also disregards the indirect effects of the international regulation of the use of force. When he asserts that "[t]he received rules of
international law neither describe accurately what nations do, nor predict
reliably what they will do, no prescribe intelligently what they should do
when considering intervention,"' 7 he fundamentally misreads the function of international law. Law is not a description of actual behavior, nor
a prediction of future behavior, nor a system of moral or ethical norms.
On the contrary, law is composed of the norms that are accepted by a
society as prescriptions for behavior. Thus, law describes what states
shall do according to the normative system accepted as binding by them.
At times, legal norms may conflict with real behavior, future behavior,
and even moral behavior,' °s but that does not change their character as
legal norms.' ° Glennon's appeal to "geopolitics"" sounds remarkably
similar to Morgenthau's repudiation of international law in favor of Realist political science in 1940."' But replacing law with a description of
state practice does not lead to law, but to political science, and leaves the
world without a commonly accepted standard for the evaluation of state
behavior.
The United States relies on Charter law in a lot of different contexts,
too: as much as the United States opposed any limits imposed by international law on its invasion of Iraq, it insists on the implementation of
Security Council resolutions, in particular regarding the defense against
terrorism. In the very period in which the United States attacked Iraq, it
was also litigating before the International Court of Justice with another
107.
Id. at 2, 204.
108.
An arguable example is the case of Kosovo. See supra note 87. Compare FRANCK,
supra note 44 at 135-91 (arguing that we should integrate moral considerations into the law)
with INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, supra note 87, and Simma,
supra note 67 (asserting that states may sometimes follow a moral rather than a legal imperative without thereby changing the law).
109.
For a defense of such a positivist attitude, see Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus,
The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist
View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1999).
110.
LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 13 ("Before law came geopolitics"); see also id.
at 177-205. Glennon is fully aware of the problematic character of this term. But his appeal to
the informal Concert of Europe disregards not only the reactionary character of this order, but
also its legal underpinnings. See id. at 278; see also Fritz MUnch, Vienna Congress (1815), in
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1286 (2000); WILHELM GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429-36 (2000).
111.
Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism,and International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 260 (1940). Glennon's arguments are quite similar to Morgenthau's. See LIMITS OF
LAW, supra note 11, at 64-65.
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member of the so-called axis of evil, namely Iran, involving questions of
self-defense. "2 The security situation in Iraq after the proclaimed end of
"major combat operations""' 3 has compelled the United States to negotiate a further U.N. resolution, which authorizes "a multinational force
under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.""'4 Recently, the United
States enlisted the United Nations to convince a recalcitrant Shiite leader
of the impossibility of organizing elections before the handover of power
to an Iraqi government."' Even within Iraq, the United Nations seems to
afford a legitimacy that the United States as occupying power alone cannot provide.
Thus, there is no escape from some kind of law. The only question is
what kind of law-whether international law translates hegemonic
power into legal obligations, or whether those obligations can effectively
constrain the superpower, too. Recent pronouncements of the Security
Council may indeed be interpreted in both ways-as a constraint, however weak, on the exercise of superpower prerogatives, or as rubberstamp for U.S. policies. In the end, they probably are somewhere in the
middle. Thus, Resolution 1511 and the preceding Resolutions 1483116
and 150017 put some constraints on the U.S.-led coalition, such as reporting and transparency requirements, but extend also considerable
authority to the Coalition Provisional Authority"" beyond the rights of an
112.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.CJ. No. 90 (Nov. 6), 42 I.L.M. 1334 (2003); Letter
Dated 19 October 1987from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19219 (1987); Letter Dated 18 April
1988from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations,
U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19791 (1988). In its Counter-Memorial and in the oral
proceedings, the United States has justified its action again according to the international law
on the use of force. For the oral and written pleadings, see the ICJ's Oil Platforms Website, at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopframe.htm. See also Oil Platforms, supra,
48-51, 67.
113.
President's Address to the Nation on Iraq from the USS Abraham Lincoln, supra
note 53, at 516.
114.
S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. SC/RES/I511
(2003); see also Peter Slevin & Bradley Graham, U.S. Renews Bid To Involve More Nations in
Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at Al.
115.
See Press Release, U.N., Secretary-GeneralWill Send Election Team to Iraq, Once
Satisfied with Coalition Security Arrangements (Jan. 27, 2004), U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9129,
IK/419 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/SGSM9129.doc.htm;
see also Edward Wong, New Pressures Over U.S. Plan For Iraqi Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2004, at Al.
116.
S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
117.
S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (2003).
118.
Resolution 1483 recognizes the exercise of the occupying powers by the Authority,
allows the use of funds of the Development Fund for Iraq, among them U.N. funds. S.C. Res.
1483, supra note 116, at 4, 6. Furthermore, the resolution introduces an independent audit of
the finances of the Development Fund for Iraq. Id. at 4.
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occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague
Regulations." 9
Even a "coalition of the willing" needs to translate its ad hoc aims
into enforceable rules. If such coalitions shall not be based on force, this
requires in turn a voluntary acceptance of U.S. prerogatives by other participants; even a superpower cannot forever forego legal commitments to
others. Law not only is a translation of power politics into fine print, but
also stabilizes delicate compromises between power and legitimacy.
2. Unilateralism v. Multilateralism
Iraq is thus not so much a question of "might versus right," but of
which mechanism determines what the law is and how it is to be applied12 0 -the unilateral pronouncements of a hegemonic superpower or a
quasi-constitutional system of checks and balances. This leads us to the
second pair of opposites that may shape the future of international law in
the age of U.S. hegemony: how far are states obliged--or, should be
obliged-to work through multilateral institutions to pursue their interests? There is little doubt that the alternative between unilateralism and
multilateralism does not exist in such an unambiguous manner. The Iraq
example shows that even the United States favored, at first, the exploration of multilateral avenues. On the other hand, in extreme situations, the
failure of multilateral institutions may sometimes not be the last word.
To secure some base values in the international system, from state survival to the prevention of genocide, unilateral action cannot always be
avoided. Still, there seems to be no agreement as to when such action is
justifiable.
The balance struck by the U.N. Charter is well known. Article 39
gives the Security Council great latitude in determining when a threat to
international peace and security, or even a breach of the peace or a war
of aggression, has occurred. The Council also enjoys broad powers to
adopt sanctions that are binding on all U.N. member states (by Article
41). The only real check on the exercise of its power consists in the veto
of the permanent members, combined with the requirement of nine
positive votes (out of 15) for the adoption of a resolution. On the other
hand, the use of force without Security Council authorization is limited by
Article 51 to instances of self-defense-an interpretation that conforms to

119.
Resolution 1483 explicitly recognizes the applicability of these instruments but
seems to interpret them in a most expansive way, basically allowing it to determine Iraq's pace
towards self-determination. Id. at 2
120.
Cf Franck, supra note 4, at 616 ("In essence, the Iraq crisis was not primarily about
what to do but, rather, who decides.")

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:691

the requirement of Security Council authorization for enforcement
action
2

of regional arrangements contained in Article 53 of the Charter.' '

The change in international law proposed by the United States in the
2002 National Security Strategy would give states such a broad latitude

for unilateral action as to risk undermining the prohibition on the use of
force and the authority of the Security Council altogether.122 If the mere
possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists would suffice to justify the unilateral use of force, any state

suspected of possessing or developing weapons of mass destruction
would become a target for the unilateral use of force. If applied to all
states, such a reinterpretation of the law might have disastrous consequences for whole regions such as the Indian subcontinent or the Middle
East.
Next to unilateral action, the Bush administration has advanced a
counter-image to permanent institutions such as the United Nations or
NATO: the "coalition of the willing."democracis.
Others speak of
"multilateralism
Acodnly
h
uA
la carte" 121 or regional coalitions of democracies. 24Accordingly, the su-

perpower builds coalitions ad hoc to complete certain tasks. Sometimes,
an organization as a whole may be enlisted. Usually, however, coalitions
of the willing will be composed of states ut singuli. The American argument for inter-state cooperation is presented as an endorsement of
national sovereignty.' In reality, however, it amounts to an assertion of
U.S. dominance, because such coalitions will be dominated by the
strongest state that will take the initiative and provide the military and
often also financial means. On the contrary, institutional decision121.
Franck has argued that regional arrangements enjoy broader rights of forceful intervention in U.N. Charter practice amounting to a reinterpretation of Charter Article 53. See
FRANCK, supra note 43, at 162. Contra Georg Ress & Jirgen Br6hmer, Article 53, in CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 864.
122.
Even supporters of exceptions to multilateralism voice such concerns. Reisman,
supra note 10, at 89-90 (proposing that the U.S. claim be regarded as a short-term, superpower-only "doctrine"). Feinstein & Slaughter express a clear preference for multilateralism
and argue for stricter terms for non-democratic states. Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 72, at
145, 148-49. Both of these arguments lead to unequal terms for certain states and can thus not
easily be squared with the principle of sovereign equality. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1; see
infra note 138 and accompanying text.
123.
The term is generally attributed to Richard Haas, former director of policy planning
at the state Department and now President of the Council on Foreign Relations.
124.
A solution preferred both by Glennon, supra note 39, at 198-201, and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Prdzisionswaffe Volkerrecht, Die Demokratien muissen sich verbiinden-zu einer
neuen Kraft innerhalb der UN, DIE ZEIT, Jul. 3, 2003, at 11. See also Press Release, Freedom
House, Creation of UN Democracy Group Urged (Aug. 12, 2003), at http://
www.freedomhouse.org/mediapressrel/081203.htm.
125.
See, e.g., Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Marshall Center 10th Anniversary, Remarks
delivered at Garmisch, Germany (Jun. 11, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.miU
speeches/2003/sp2003061 1-secdef0285.html.
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making, whether in the United Nations or NATO, requires a larger consensus or unanimity so that each partner can exert influence on collective
decisions.
Violence unleashed by states is of a special character, and brings
with it more dangers and risks than foresight can predict. Long-term
consequences of military action are almost impossible to ascertain in
advance-Iraq is an example in point. International legitimacy provided
by international institutions may thus constitute quite real support towards receiving broad assistance in taming the long-term consequences
of the use of force. Institutional responses to new threats may thus prove
more effective than the unilateral use of force of doubtful legitimacy.
Nevertheless, international law must find a way to renegotiate the relationship between multilateral and unilateral action, in particular when
dealing with large crimes against international law and new threats emanating from non-state sources. Whereas multilateral legitimation is
always preferable, in case of institutional apathy or inertia, unilateral
emergency action should not be excluded. Only when international institutions work effectively in countering real threats to states, such as
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, may they effectively prevent
unilateral action. In the words of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in
his 2003 address to the General Assembly:
[I]t is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face
up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely
vulnerable, and thus drive them to take unilateral action. We
must show that those concerns can,
and will, be addressed effec26
tively through collective action.
Thus, the future of multilateralism may well depend on the realization by the U.S. government that truly multilateral decision-making will
be more successful in the long run than the ad hoc remedy of 'coalitions
of the willing' that do not last longer than the willingness of the contributors. On the other hand, the international community should
improve the effectiveness of international institutions
and address ques27
tions regarding their democratic legitimacy.
3. Prevention v. Repression
The argument in favor of prevention seems compelling. Even before
the invention of weapons of mass destruction, would it not have been
126.
Press Release, Kofi Annan, Adoption of Policy of Pre-emption Could Result in
Proliferation of Unilateral, Lawless Use of Force, Secretary-General Tells General Assembly
(Sept. 23, 2003), U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8891, GA/10157, available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2003/sgsm8891 .doc.htm.

127.

Cf Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 71, at 137.
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preferable to attack Hitler in 1936 before he was able to build the German Wehrmacht to its war strength, or to beat Al Qaeda before it could
execute the attacks of September l1th, 2001? And do not weapons of
mass destruction render the problem more urgent in light of the potential
consequences of their use? However, the real problem has little to do
with these arguments. The true difficulties lie elsewhere: 1) how is one to
ascertain the facts?; and 2) who decides? Unilateral decisions lead to a
jungle in which self-serving explanations of the use of force will
abound. 28 Thus, one should rather ask whether prevention by multilateral
means works-or can, at least, be made to work.
As it turns out, the inspections in Iraq in the 1990s had been far
more effective than the inspectors themselves had believed. 2 9 The inspection route taken by Resolution 1441 (2002) was not exhausted.
Other cases of proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, also involved
inspections. However, they only worked because of state cooperation.
States are more ready to accept inspections when they come from a multilateral institution rather than from another state. In Iraq, only the
combination of intelligence received from U.S. and other services and
international inspectors on the ground ensured reliable evidence. In Iran,
the British-Franco-German agreement opened the way for inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 3 °
The U.S. attitude towards the strengthening of international institutions in the field of prevention has recently changed to the negative,
however. It is the United States that has, at the eleventh hour, prevented the
adoption of a protocol on biological weapons, which would have introduced a control and inspection regime similar to that of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention."' Concerning
the latter, U.S. cooperation seems to be wanting, in spite of the reluctant
128.

For an in-depth treatment, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Ad Hoc War, in CRISIS MANPROTECTION (Horst Fischer et al. eds., forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 399).
129.
See supra note 72; BLIX, supra note 8, at 20-28 (remarking on the dubious role of
David Kay).
130.
Leverett, supra note 59.
131.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975). The U.S.'s proposed alternative relies on traditional international criminal law concepts and on the after-the-fact
investigation of suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use. See President's
Statement on Strengthening the International Regime Against Biological Weapons, 2001 PuB.
PAPERS 1332 (Nov.
1, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/11/20011 l01.html. On the negotiations, see Onno Kervers, Strengthening Compliance
with the BiologicalWeapons Convention: The Protocol Negotiations, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECUAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN

L. 275 (2002); Onno Kervers, Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention: The DraftProtocol, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 161 (2003).
RITY
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ratification during the Clinton administration. The U.S. Senate has
blocked the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and the Landmines

Convention will not be ratified by the United States any time soon. Thus,
the lack of an effective non-proliferation regime is not only due to the

existence of "rogue states," but just as much to the U.S. reluctance to
build on the existing institutions to control the further spread of WMD.
As to the repressive side, the Rome conference on the International
Criminal Court was unable to agree on an effective system of criminal
prosecution of the proliferation of WMD.'32 As long as the United States
and other states obstruct an effective multilateralism, arguments as to the
ineffectiveness of international institutions sound hollow.

However, this does not give an answer to the question of when it is
appropriate unilaterally to preempt a regime from using WMD or supporting terrorist acts. Substantive criteria seem difficult to develop. The
Caroline formula 33 draws a relatively narrow line, only accepting imminent threats that are relatively easy to assess.' 34 While the Caroline
doctrine may be satisfactory for situations of an imminent land war, it
might indeed, as the National Security Strategy asserts, be less appropriate for effectively preventing the potential harm from weapons of mass
destruction in time.'35 The differences between the approaches of the

United States and Europe, old or new, seem to lie not so much in substance as in form. In the European view, the "first line of defense" is to
be determined multilaterally, through international organizations and in
36
multilateral partnership with the United States, rather than unilaterally.'
In any case, the Iraq conflict hardly qualifies, because it turns out that
the coalition was well aware of the fact that any potential threat from the
132.
Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, art. 8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 94-97 (entered into force Jul. 1, 2002), only
penalizes the use of weapons already prohibited by the Hague Regulations and the 1925 Geneva Protocol (in subparagraphs xvii and xviii), id. at 96. In addition, in subparagraph (xx), it
refers to an annex to be agreed upon in future negotiations among the state parties. Id.
133.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Although in one of the post-Charter instances frequently mentioned, the so-called
134.
Six-Days-War, the threat seems to have been, in hindsight, less imminent than apparent at the
time, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 173 (3d ed. 2001).
135.
On this point, see Sofaer, supra note 41, at 214.
EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER
136.
WORLD: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 20 passim (2003), available at http://www.isseu.org/solana/solanae.pdf; see also EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, in 66 CHAILLOT PAPERS: FIGHTING PROLIFERATION -EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
93, 96, 14 (2003), available at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai66e.pdf. Both strategies
were adopted by the European Council on Dec. 12, 2003. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels
European Council 12 and 13 December 2003, In 84, 87 (2004), available at http://ue.eu.int/
ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ecf78364.pdf. The argument for a multilateral decisionmaking process is forcefully made by Bothe, supra note 43, at 239-40; see also Feinstein &
Slaughter, supra note 71, at 148.
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Iraqi weapons program was not about to materialize. To counter dangers
emanating from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, international cooperation is key. In the long run, the success of coalitionbuilding within multilateral institutions may well turn out to be superior
to unilateral preventive action. Thus, there is nothing wrong about preemption as such. However, difficulties of risk-assessment and the danger
of using preemption as pretext for the use of force point, at least in the
absence of an imminent threat, to multilateral
rather than unilateral proc37
esses to achieve effective preemption.
4. Hegemony v. Sovereign Equality
Others criticize the Charter principle of sovereign equality as a chimera138 that prevents international law from addressing the real problems
of hegemony. Both the problem and its novelty seem to be overstated,
though. Sovereign equality as a legal principle depends not only on the
underlying power rationale, but also on perceptions of legitimacy. If we
do not wish to give up the distinctness of international law from political
power altogether, international law must not simply reflect or describe
political power, but try to influence and constrain the unilateral use of
force. 139 On the other hand, under international law, sovereignty has
never been absolute. The Charter itself contains the most important legal
limit to the equality of states, namely the binding force of Security
Council resolutions and the decisive role of the permanent veto-carrying
members in their adoption.
Can sovereign equality be maintained for long when it not only fails
to reflect the distribution of power capabilities-which it has never
done-but when the most powerful member no longer recognizes the
authority of the common institutions?'4° When U.S. President Bush, in
137.
For a more elaborate argument to this effect, see Luban, supra note 89, at 223-28.
Among other things, he points to the fact that the U.S. justification of pre-emptive wars
against risks of the proliferation of WMD would also have permitted attacks against Pakistan
and even Russia. Id. at 233.
138.
Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy,Equality and US Predominance
in International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 135, 173-75 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
139.
See Michel Cosnard, Sovereign Equality-"The Wimbledon Sails On", in UNITED
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 138, at 117,

119 ("The analysis of sovereignty does not aim to describe the extent of one state's power, but
to explain why a subject of international law is legally empowered .....Sovereignty is a legal
quality of power, recognized by international law as belonging to every state... ").
140.
Cf Gregory H. Fox, Comment on Chapters4 and 5, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 138, at 187, 189-90. For a more

extensive treatment of the argument that a U.S. hegemon unbound by international law is in
the general interest of global values, see Luban, supra note 89, at 236-48; Just Wars, supra
note 89.
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his State of the Union speech of 2003, emphasized that "the course of
this nation does not depend on the decisions of others,"'' 4' he effectively
denied the existence of multilateral checks on U.S. action, whether military or otherwise. He thus confirmed the earlier challenges to the United
Nations contained in his address of September 12, 2002-either you do
what we want, or we will do it alone anyway' 42-and to all other states
20, 2001-"[e]ither you are with us, or you are
dating from September
43
with the terrorists."'

Nico Krisch has argued that the U.S. unwillingness to accept international legal constraints results in "a far-reaching hierarchical system
which enables the United States to subordinate other States to law it has
itself created-which enables the United States, in effect, to govern other
States."'" Indeed, the United States practices a strategic and, at times,
tactical use of international law-trying to impose obligations on others
while remaining unrestricted itself. Thus, it insists on the fulfillment of the
obligations of other states under Article 25 of the Charter, in particular
regarding the anti-terrorism measures contained in SC Res. 1373 (2001).
Being the single superpower, the United States can make the most out of
the sovereign rights extended to it by the international legal system. The
separation of law and power dictates that the United States may (ab)use
international prerogatives to prevent the emergence of new law or to violate existing international law, but it cannot make international law by
itself alone.'4 5 Thus, preemptive self-defense will only become legal if
and to the extent the U.S. claim is accepted by other states. "Sovereign
equality" does not constitute a utopian description of a world-to-be in
which all states are equal in power and well-being, but a principle of
how to create and enforce norms binding on other states. Sovereign
equality always was a legal fiction, but it constitutes, as Pierre-Marie
141.
President's Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the state of the Union, supra note 64, at 114. The full passage reads:
America's purpose is more than to follow a process-it is to achieve a result: the
end of terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us, and many
are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. ...Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the
freedom and security of the American people....
Id.
142.
1532.
143.

President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 50, at
President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States

Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
2001).
144.
Krisch, supra note 138, at 136.
145.
Cf Reisman, supra note 10, at 82, 90.
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1140, 1142 (Sept. 20,
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Dupuy has146observed, nothing less than the constituent fiction of international law.
At the very moment when the most powerful member, which has
so far maintained the system in the first place, questions the binding
character of international law, and thus the binding character of its own
formal pronouncements (treaties) and actions accompanied by conviction of their normative character (customary law), international law
becomes threatened as such. 47 This would not so much extend to the
United States the characteristics of a world government,' 8 but of an
imperial power that intends to impose its commands and laws on others
without being bound by them itself' 49-a Hobbesian sovereign indeed. 5 Just as much as Hobbes is not any more acceptable in a
democratic society under the "rule of law," neither could modern international law accept a world governed by the single superpower without
legal checks and balances.
Of course, there still is the possibility of the acceptance of the U.S.
views by the international community. Instead of a quasi-Hobbesian
United States above the law, U.S. predominance would be assured
within the law. Michael Byers understands the National Security Strategy as an attempt to achieve such dominance:
[T]he effort to change the rules concerning the use of force...
is an effort to alter dramatically this important area of international law in favor of the United States. If the effort succeeds,
the United States will be able to justify a substantial portion of
its military action on the basis of a modified customary international law right of self-defense-one that is not subject to
the constraints of the UN Charter. . . . The result would-at
least with regard to the rules on the use of force-amount to an
imperial system of international law.'

146.

Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Comment on Chapters4 and 5, in UNITED STATES
138, at 176, 178-79.

HEGEMONY

AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

147.
See id. at 183.
148.
But see Krisch, supra note 138, at 173 ("[D]espite the caveats above, the United
States still operates in a fashion similar to a world government.").
149.
Cf 4 JOHN ADAMS, Novanglus, in WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 106 (1851) (stating
the famous adage of the rule of law as government of laws, not of men). For a transfer of this
adage to the international sphere, see Letter of the Honorable Elihu Root to Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 597
(1919). See also Bruno Simma, InternationalAdjudication and U.S. Policy-Past, Present,

and Future, in
2001).
150.
151.

DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW

Krisch, supra note 138, at 170.
Byers, supra note 43, at 189.

39, 56 (N. Dorsen & P. Gifford eds.,
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Byers nevertheless regards this conduct as preferable to an open
breach of the law. Unfortunately, the effort to change the law and a
concomitant breach of the law do not exclude each other. The argument
advanced by President Bush can be understood that way. If the law is
not changed our way, we disregard it. Thus, international law in a
hegemonic sense will either not contain any limits to U.S. power, or it
will be disregarded by the hegemon. In either case, international law as
such will be irrelevant as a factor in U.S. decision-making.
This need not remain so. The more the United States understands
that it has a long-term interest in the existence of a strong international
law to fight international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, the more it will be ready to accept certain constraints on
itself. In this vein, respect for international law may well turn out to be
the best avenue to achieve global co-operation on these vital issues. To
be convincing, this does also require the readiness to assume oneself
the same obligations as other states.' 2 Ultimately, U.S. hegemony is
very strong regarding military means, but in other areas, such as trade
or human rights, the effectiveness of U.S. leadership is based on the
power of persuasion rather than the power of its guns. Thus, the relationship between military hegemony and international legitimacy,
between power and law needs to be permanently negotiated and renegotiated. International institutions, in particular the Security Council,
still constitute the most appropriate fora for this process of negotiation
and adjustment.
5. Democracy v. Peace
Closely related to, but nevertheless distinct from, the questions of
the legitimate use of force is the cultural and ethical dimension. In the
National Security Strategy, the argument in favor of "regime change"
in Iraq is closely linked to the claim of the primacy of "western" values. 53 Pursuant to the thesis of the "democratic peace,"'" the
democratization of Iraq by force transforms into an act of securing
152.
But see Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 71, at 145 (seeming to argue for a regime
differentiating between democratic and other states). "The provisional agreement [between
Iran and European states] ...recognizes that regimes such as Iran's, because they sponsor
terrorism, repress democracy, and have clear nuclear designs, are not entitled to the same
rights as other NPT members." Id. I would rather suggest distinguishing between states with a
clean record on WMD and those who have already violated the regime in question. Additional
criteria would limit the participation in the system to democratic states and would render it
thereby almost useless.
153.
See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at 1 passim.
154.
See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF.205

(1983);

BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR

A POST COLD-WAR WORLD

(1993).
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peace. Or, in the words of the U.S. president, "freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for, and the advance of freedom leads
to peace. ,,155
This value-optimism is not limited to the Bush administration.
Since the end of the Cold War, (neo)liberal philosophers and international lawyers are increasingly looking for an international law that
would not treat each state alike. No less than John Rawls has embraced
a distinction between "liberal" and "non-liberal" societies, with "decent hierarchical" but not totalitarian societies in the middle.' 56 Others
view a "democratic caucus" within the U.N. as more apt in deciding on
the use of force for humanitarian purposes than the Security Council.'57
However, if the use of force shall be based on the consent of the larger
part of the community, and not only of states deemed democratic, it
seems inapt to draw a line between democratic and non-democratic
rather than between peaceful (or, in the language of Article 4 of the
Charter, "peace-loving") and non-peaceful states.
The emphasis of the Charter on the primordial value of peace allows for an argument based on the more peaceful nature of democratic
states. The step from the theory of "democratic peace" to the justification of intervention in authoritarian states is a small, but significant
one. The thesis of the "democratic peace" originates in an analysis of
state interests and behavior: Liberal and democratic states loathe war
because it hurts their own populations and interests as much as those of
the enemy. This description is turned into a prescription for unilateral
intervention: only if the world becomes liberal and democratic in the
western image will8 it live in peace. Wilson's "War to End All Wars"
comes into mind. 1
The democratic-peace approach, whether it is grounded in evidence
or not,'5 9 can however not guarantee peace in a world which is still less
dominated by liberal and democratic states than one might wish. Or, in
order for it to do so, one would have to draw the category of democ155.
President's Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, supra note 80, at 1543.
156.
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
LECTURES 41, 60-68 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993); see also JOHN RAWLS, THE
LAW OF PEOPLES WITH THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED 62-78 (1999).

157.
158.

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS.

FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST

(1992). Cf Lawrence Kaplan, Regime Change, THE NEW

REPUB-

LIC, Mar. 3, 2003, at 21 (discussing the new Wilsonianism displayed by parts of the Bush
administration).
159.
See John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (2003). For
a sharp critique, see Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International
Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449,463-67 (1997).
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ratic states so broadly that "democracy" becomes a meaningless term.
When it is used to justify the use of force, it will easily lead to the opposite, namely a global war of the self-appointed forces of light with
the forces of darkness. ' 60 International law has always been the space
where conflicts of values (and interests) in a pluralist world have been
negotiated. However, contemporary international law also contains a
set of values which are deemed non-derogable-or ius cogens. Unlike
the prohibition on the use of force, 6' "democratic governance" is not
one of these values, because the precise definition and implications of
"democracy" are still in dispute. In principle, this ambiguity forecloses
a democratic imperialism that would use force to implement democracy. Nevertheless, the promotion of liberal and democratic values by
itself is, of course, permissible. If used parsimoniously and with respect of local circumstances, liberal and democratic values can lead to
the expression of pluralism rather than its suppression by force. The
insistence on the primacy of one's own values, however, followed, in
extremis, by the use of force, does not entail persuasion of others, but
resistance. The connection of use of force with the spread of democracy is not a recipe for democratic peace, but risks inter-cultural war.
IV. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER-WORLD

The Iraq conflict has divided the western alliance more than any
other since the end of the Second World War. However, it also provides
us with a set of conflicting views about international law and international relations, both in the argument for the invasion as in the
argument against it. This Article has argued that it is wrong simply to
regard this debate as one of a law-breaker against those upholding the
law. Rather, both the security and the domestic legitimacy arguments
need to be taken seriously. As we have seen, many supporters of the
Bush administration regard legal constraints as either irrelevant or detrimental for decisions to use force. But this analysis has also shown
that the Bush administration has combined its ambivalence towards
existing international law with claims to revise it: to allow for preemptive and anticipatory use of force, to implement Security Council by

160.
Cf REINHOLD NIEHBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS (2nd ed. 1960).
161.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. No. 90 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge
Simma, 6 and preface), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1428-30 (2003) (stating a need for the court to
reaffirm the law of the use of force).
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unilateral "coalitions of the willing," and actively to pursue the spread
of democracy and human rights against dictatorship.
What does this tell us for the future of international law? Some62
claim that the regulation of the use of force by the Charter has failed.1
But they do not provide any alternative mechanism to provide international legitimacy. Ultimately, a Charter conception of international law
is compatible with liberal and democratic values, but attempts to realize these values by peaceful means. International law, with its
insistence on consensus and persuasion, embodies the virtues of a "culture of formalism," in Martti Koskenniemi's felicitous phrase, 163 that
does not attempt to impose one's own values on others, combined with
a slow development of common values that may allow for some minimum rules of behavior across different cultures and religions.
Ultimately, for all its shortcomings and failures, no other system is in
sight that could substitute for this function of the United Nations. The
post-war situation in Iraq seems to demonstrate that the consequences
of war cannot be assessed beforehand, however slight the war may appear on first sight. This might strengthen rather than weaken the insight
of the drafters of the Charter that the use of force seldom solves problems, but, rather, constitutes one itself. 64 Democracy and the
international rule of law are no opposites. The respect for the international rule of law also constitutes an important element of the external
behavior of democratic states. The increasing importance and transformative potential of human rather than state rights for the
international rule of law includes the respect for the right to life, which
is the first victim of any war. An international rule of law without a
workable prohibition on the use of force, or, in other words, a duty to
respect the right to life of other people(s),' 6 would remain incomplete,
to say the least. Nevertheless, if we do not want to stand idle when
faced with crimes against humanity and genocide committed by states
against their own populations, the right to be protected from military
162.
For example, see Glennon's arguments supra note 39.
163.
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870-1960, 494-509 (2002).
164.
Hardly anybody in Washington still asks "who's next?" The state of affairs was
quite different less than half a year ago. See Ivo H. DAALDER & JAMES M. LINDSAY, AMERICA
UNBOUND: THE BUSH REVOLUTION IN FOREIGN POLICY 172 (2003). For a similar point of
view, see Brunnde & Toope, supra note 88.
165.
The connection between the prohibition on the use of force and human rights has
been recently clarified by Luban, supra note 89, at 218 ("The decision to ban the use of force
except in self-defense represented a judgment, emerging from the smoldering ruins of Europe
and Japan, that treating war as an instrument of policy poses an intolerable threat to 'fundamental human rights' and 'the dignity and worth of the human person'" (quoting U.N.
CHARTER pmbl.)). As Luban adds this does not exclude humanitarian intervention when certain conditions are met. Id. at 218-19n.21; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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interference may, in extreme cases, have to give way to the use of
armed force as a last resort against massive violations of human rights.
The Iraq conflict was a momentous event, but not the first instance
where the world superpower has allegedly disregarded the international
rules on the use of force. International textbooks are replete with examples, from Grenada to Sudan. 66 International law could never be
enforced against a superpower. Indeed, the effective implementation of
international law largely depends on the support of the United States.
But, arguably, the project of an international rule of law has lost, in the
Iraq war, nothing of its usefulness, even for a superpower with a global
reach that cannot, in spite of all imperialist temptations, manage the
world alone.1 67 In the words of Michael Walzer, "[the U.S. administration] will 6learn sooner or later that hegemony, unlike empire, rests on

consent." 1
To conclude, let us revisit some of those uses of international law.
First of all, international law continues to provide the framework and
language for a dialogue regarding the pursuit of principled, long-term
policies. It may not determine outcomes, but will influence them, if
only because the actors know of the necessity of justifying their actions
according to internationally recognized criteria for what is "right.' 69
Being both parsimonious by using consent- and custom-based methods
to ground obligation, and value-laden through the development of
cross-cultural principles and rules, international law is an important
tool for dealing with the global concerns in today's world-human
rights, the environment, peace.
Second, the war against Iraq has changed nothing with respect to
the much broader field covered by international law. There still exists a
growing need for global regulation in a globalized world, from finance
and trade to human rights. Indeed, as the post-war phase in Iraq has
shown, if violence shall not last for ever, any use of force has to give
way to non-violent means of conflict-solution, based on a minimum set
of common values and institutions-the very values and institutions
international law has helped to develop. Under these circumstances, the
United Nations can, as representative of the whole international

166.
Compare the defense of international law-making based on consent and not on
superpower imposition by Farer, supra note 8, at 607-08.
167.
This point is also a cornerstone of the rising U.S. critique. See DAALDER & LINoSAY, supra note 164, at 195.
168.
Michael Walzer, Is There an American Empire?, DISSENT, Fall 2003, at 27, 29,
availableat http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/faO3/walzer.htm.
169.
See ABRAHAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND
THE ROLE OF LAW 102 (1974); Friedrich Kratochwil, How Do Norms Matter?, in THE ROLE
OF LAw IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 53 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Stromseth, supra note 8,
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community, provide the legitimacy that is eluding the United States as
occupying power.
Third, as can be observed in post-war Iraq, the use of force without
the clear and unequivocal support of international law and institutions
is costly in terms of so-called political capital, e.g. the costs of
maintaining fragile "coalitions of the willing" and enlisting
international support. Thus, the legitimacy bestowed on military action
by international institutions is everything but negligible"7 For
example, a Security Council resolution would have allowed not only
for a larger coalition including, among others, France, Turkey, and
NATO as such, but also for a more inclusive and more acceptable postwar regulation. Every use of force has to give way to a regulation of
peace involving binding commitments of the parties, which can only be
done by using international law. In addition, the fight against terror
requires broad international cooperation. A United States abandoning
multilateralism will have a much harder time in winning support for
the implementation of anti-terrorism measures.
Fourth, the rest of the world, and Europe in particular, depends on
a United States that is willing to employ its huge military and
economic capabilities for issues of global concern and the
implementation of international law. In the absence of a world state
with a world police force-whose presence would be a nightmare
rather than a dream-international law needs powerful states to enforce
international rules and principles. However, if power and legitimacy
shall not remain apart, they need to negotiate with each other. To take
up Robert Kagan's image,"' the relationship between Venus and Mars
may be tempestuous, but neither can live without the other, even if they
may not meet at the Four Seasons Hotel, but rather in a shabby place
on the East River.
Power without international recognition and legitimacy will not be
viable. Legality without power will remain a dead letter. The compromise between normativity and reality has to be negotiated and renegotiated. The global institutions where this permanent negotiation
takes place may be slow, bureaucratic, corrupt, and cynical. But if they
did not exist, we would have to invent them. Certainly, there is much
need for democratic reform. But renewed institutionalized settings can
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only be found and implemented when based on the very consensus that
is the precondition for the existence of an international communityand by the use of international law to provide the language and terms
of its existence.

